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Abstract 
The debate whether democracy and its procedures are capable of tackling climate change has 
been going on for years. One mechanism that has been claimed to yield improved 
environmental performance is deliberation. Meetings between civil society and politicians are 
assumed to generate more ambitious environmental policy. The field have been characterised 
by normative and qualitative research. Conducting quantitative studies has however not been 
possible due to lack of data of deliberation. Thanks to the Varieties of Democracy institute data 
on deliberation is now available. This study contributes to the discussion regarding potential 
relationships between deliberation and increased efforts of climate change mitigation. This is 
done by statistical analysis of deliberation and emissions of carbon dioxide per capita (CO2). 
The results do not indicate any relationship between deliberation and CO2 emissions per capita. 
The robustness of the model can be discussed signifying that further research should be done, 
possibly with different operationalisations. Measuring democratic indicators are questionable 
making further research necessary.  
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Introduction and purpose 
To claim that climate change is real is becoming less and less controversial. In the 
light of the effects of climate change the demand for effective tools to accomplish a sustainable 
development increase. As the problem of increasing temperatures requires global solutions 
states are one the most important actors. States can enter international agreements, legislate on 
limits of emissions and relief taxes on green alternatives. Therefore, it becomes important to 
find out what kind of governance that is most capable of tackling climate change. There is a 
debate whether democratic systems can deal with the environmental problems. When the 
solutions tend to be unpopular often because of the big expenditure they require in terms of 
taxation on fuel and economical ventures in new technology. Are politicians able to do what is 
required to save the planet in the long haul when they may sacrifice being elected in the coming 
elections? In addition, one can wonder what the public really wants and what they are willing 
to sacrifice for a sustainable future? Would they be in favour of stricter environmental 
regulations and legislations? These are valid questions and they are subject of a debate that in 
a lot of ways lacks empirical background. The reason for the lack of empirical research probably 
comes from the fact that measuring democracy is hard and often problematic. However, it is 
today possible to conduct empirical research on democracy using several available datasets with 
information about democracy. 
One of the democratic procedures that some scholars claim is appropriate for 
tackling climate change is deliberation. A deliberative system offers channels of 
communication and deliberative discussions between authorities and civil society. The idea is 
that the public will use their influence to advocate environmental regulations. The aim of this 
study is to find out if there is a relationship between deliberation and countries´ efforts to 
mitigate climate change. Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) is the main driver for climate 
change (Houghton, 2009, p. 35), therefore, emissions of CO2 per capita will be seen as a case 
of climate change in this study. By using statistical design, the result of this study is a 
quantitative empirical input to the debate whether deliberation can be a contributing factor in 
countries mitigation of climate change.  It is highly unlikely that the fluctuations of CO2 
emissions could be explained by one factor and therefore a substantial part of the study also 
explore possible effects of control variables, with the aim to isolate the effect of deliberation. 
The study is divided into sections. First, I present previous research and theory. 
The second section will present the methodology. In the third section the results are presented 
2 
 
and analysed. The study is then rounded off with conclusions and some recommendations on 
what future research could focus on. 
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Theory and previous research 
Scholars have for years theorised whether democracy is favorable for the 
environment or not (Li and Reuveny, 2006, Jagers, 2007, Eckersley, 2004, Scruggs, 2009). One 
can argue that people according to classic economic literature are profit maximisers (Smith, 
1990) and that they will not vote for politicians that advocates regulations as taxes on fuel, meat 
and coal energy and limit the economic development. It is after all the liberal market economies 
in democratic countries that historically have driven the emission of greenhouse gases 
(Ciesielski, 2013). At the same time, one can argue that the public´s will is to conserve the 
environment and when they can they will advocate for the sake of the environment. Therefore, 
it is logical to enhance the general public’s access to political forums. Access to political forums 
and politicians consulting the civil society when designing new laws is within the concepts of 
deliberation. Deliberative democracy means that the state consults the people when writing new 
laws. The deliberative perspective of democracy is based on the idea that the ones being affected 
of a political decision also should participate in designing it (Smith, 2003, pp. 54-60). 
Discussion is essential in a deliberative democracy and via discussion, rational 
consideration and compromises the different sides will find a solution acceptable for everyone. 
Consensus and the rule of the majority is not the most important as in a representative system. 
In the deliberative system the interest of minorities but also future generations interests are also 
valid. The procedures where different interests are considered is the important part according 
to Lidskog and Elander (2007, p. 90) and Smith (2003, p. 64). Advocates for deliberation claim 
that it is a suitable tool for dealing with complex matters such as climate change. Some Scholars 
claim that deliberative democracy will lead to decreasing environmental degradation. As people 
will gain from, for example, lower emissions from CO2 people will use their influence on policy 
makers in a deliberative governance to do so (Lidskog and Elander, 2007). Graham Smith 
argues that policy makers in the democracies today, also representative ones, are situated too 
far away from the outcomes of their policies to see the actual results. Groups, including nature 
itself, without financial or social capital are excluded from designing of policy (Smith, 2003, p. 
62). Deliberation should therefore be a system well equipped to minimise the gap between the 
politicians and the outcome of policy via deliberative forums. 
One of the most cited researchers in the field, John Dryzek, states that deliberative 
forms of democracy is particularly suitable for dealing whit the environmental issue. No other 
form of governance is according to him capable of handling such complex issues (Dryzek, 
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1987). He also means that a lot of the problems in the world origins from lack of logical 
reasoning. In the long run no one has anything to gain from environmental depletion which 
make distinct collective action logical. Despite this uncontroversial statement the world lacks 
international agreements dealing with environmental problems in many areas such as emissions 
of CO2. Deliberative democracy would create forums where the impartial and rational solutions 
would be easier to reach (Dryzek, 1990).  Graham Smith deem in addition to Dryzek that the 
environmental movement is widespread in its opinions and priorities that deliberative 
discussion is fundamental for progress and legitimacy (Smith, 2003, p. 65). The advantage of 
deliberative democracy contra western liberal democracy from Dryzek´s perspective lies in its 
ability to overcome the human flaw of bounded rationality. This meaning that in a policy-
making situation the one making the decision is limited in terms of information, cognitive 
abilities, time and other factors often resulting in not so rational decision (Fearon, 1998, p. 49). 
James Fearon agrees with Dryzek and Smith and claims that deliberative decision making, if 
not eliminate, moderate the human factor and make sure that multiple options and opinions are 
being considered. Another effect is that different ideas can build on each other resulting in 
outcomes that would have been impossible in other forums (Fearon, 1998, p. 50). 
One can draw parallels between theories saying that democratic mechanisms are 
positive for the environment and theories claiming that economic development has a positive 
effect on the environment. Grossman & Krueger means that the environmental stress caused by 
society can be explained by economic development. The relationship is illustrated by an 
inverted U- curve. The theory is widely known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). It 
is based on the idea that a societies effect on the environment has a positive relationship with 
the economic development which lead to increased stress on the environment. At a certain 
tipping point shifting norms of the society, green technology and environmental regulations 
cause a decoupling of economic development and environmental degradation. The authors do 
not mean that this effect would appear automatically. Instead their idea is that as the economic 
development continues the public’s demand for environmentally friendly technology and policy 
increases and politicians will then respond to this demand (Grossman and Krueger, 1995, pp. 
371-372) . One could therefore argue that deliberation and economic development associate 
with environmental performance in harmony. As the public does not gain from environmental 
degradation it is logical to assume that, when given opportunity, they will advocate policy 
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preserving the environment. Just like the case of EKC one can think that this environmental 
engagement should rise as other needs like poverty is being dealt with and fulfilled. 
In addition to theories claiming that deliberative democracy can be a tool for 
overcoming the failings of humans there is also the idea that nature needs its own voice. In a 
conventional liberal democracy nature does not have valid claims and interest.  In a deliberative 
polity interest groups and civil society can plead natures cause. Therefore, one can argue that 
deliberation is important for making environmental policy (Goodin, 1996, p. 847) . If nature 
should have valid claims or not is of course a normative question and not something I will 
discuss deeper. However, if one come to the conclusion that nature in itself is a legitimate actor, 
deliberation is likely to be one of the aspects of governance that gives nature the most influence. 
At the same time as deliberation allow actors to lobby for the sake of the 
environment, it also means that those against stricter environmental laws are being given the 
same opportunity. This raises the question of why people will use their voice to advocate stricter 
environmental laws. One can argue that representatives from industries relying on fossil fuel 
would use deliberative democracy as a tool to work against stricter environmental policy. One 
cannot be sure of the outcome of deliberative democracy (Smith, 2003, p. 76). Robert Goodin 
expresses it better than most others: 
 
“To advocate democracy is to advocate procedures, to advocate 
environmentalism is to advocate substantive outcomes: what guarantee can we 
have that the former procedures will yield the latter sorts of outcomes?”  
(Goodin, 1992, p. 168) 
 
 Some of the critic against the assumption that deliberation will yield better 
environmental performance origins from the eco authoritarian perspective. As people got more 
power in liberal democracies they consume more and expand their ecological footprint. One 
could therefore argue that the public needs to be guided by some sort of green authoritarian 
leader. Goodin suggests that environmental outcomes should be prioritised at the expense of 
democratic procedures. By rational reasoning one must come the conclusion that environmental 
performance is too important to be jeopardized (Goodin, 1992, p. 120). That solving the 
environmental crisis is important is obvious. However, are we prepared to tamper on democratic 
liberties to meet does ends? Robin Eckersley disagree with Goodin saying that democratic 
freedoms has an intrinsic value (Eckersley, 1996, p. 223). Instead she offers something that 
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could be called a middle way. It is logical to see deliberative democracy as an extension of 
liberal democracy, as deliberative elements in policy making enhances the people rights and 
liberties. Eckersley means that those regulations that are required for mitigating or stopping the 
environmental degradation will not be carried out in a liberal democracy. In a liberal society 
the public does not tolerate to be restricted more than what is considered as necessary. To be 
able to create a truly green state one must shift the focus on individual rights, for example the 
right to consume, to a more holistic approach to rights. If one person’s exercise of liberal rights 
restricts another person´s possibilities to exercise his or hers liberal rights, how liberal is that 
(Eckersley, 2004)? An example of this could be that in a modern liberal society everyone is free 
to consume, which could have the effect of rising sea levels caused by climate change that force 
islanders to move. But why would this problem be solved in a deliberative society?  
One can argue that advocates of deliberative democracy are relying too heavily 
on the ones participating in these forums to act unselfish. Why would not a situation of Garret 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) occur in a deliberative democracy? The critic 
against the view that deliberative democracy would have a positive effect on the environment 
in, for example, terms of decreasing CO2 emissions must be considered as relevant and valid. 
How can we know that those participating in these deliberative forums would advocate stricter 
environmental laws? The simple answer is that we do not know for certain which pinpoints the 
need for empirical research on the matter. Although there is an extensive literature in this field 
scholars have not been able to conduct quantitative empirical research, until a few years ago 
when extensive data on deliberation and democracy became available. Varieties of democracies 
institute from University of Gothenburg produces datasets consisting of indicators of 
democracy, deliberation being one of them. This make it possible to conduct quantitative 
empirical studies which contributes to the discussion whether deliberation, and in the long run, 
democracy can impede climate change. 
As pointed out there is today no way to be sure whether deliberation would result 
in lower emissions of CO2 or more care for the environment in general. However, Smith argues 
that it should be considered likely as a deliberative polity would offer a context where diversity 
of environmental interests would be processed (Smith, 2003, p. 76). Consequently, the first 
hypothesis for this study is that deliberation is associated with lower emissions of CO2. Note 
that it is not deliberative democracy that is examined but deliberative components in all kinds 
of governance. It is possible that an authoritarian state receives high score for deliberation, even 
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if this is less likely compared to democracies. However, one can argue that deliberation needs 
a democratic context to be a force for lower emissions of CO2. Without the democratic 
mechanisms such as rule of law and accountability, deliberative components in a country would 
be less likely to work. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this study is that the relationship of 
deliberation and CO2 emissions will strengthen in democratic countries. 
Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis of this study is that deliberation, whether it is in a democratic 
context or not, is associated with lower levels of CO2 emissions. 
 
H1 Higher levels of deliberation are associated with lower levels of CO2 
emissions. 
The second hypothesis is that deliberation needs a democratic context to lower 
the emissions of CO2. 
 
H2 Higher levels of deliberation are only associated with lower levels of CO2 
emissions in democratic countries. 
 
 Given the stated research question and hypotheses there are mainly three possible 
patterns of the relationship. The first one is that deliberation really is connected to lower CO2 
emissions. Second, deliberation is associated with higher emissions of CO2. Third, deliberation 
is not related to these emissions at all. These conclusions will be made by reviewing the output 
from regression analysis. By doing this it is possible to see potential relationships, whether 
these are negative or positive and if they are statistically significant. 
Additional application  
The main focus of this study is to study possible relationships between 
deliberation and CO2 emissions, but the aim is of course to say as much as possible in a wider 
environmental perspective. Irrespectively of the conclusion whether deliberation is related to 
levels of CO2 emissions or not one must wonder if the same relationship can be found between 
deliberation and other environmental performance indicators. It is reasonable to think that 
above described elements of deliberation not only relates to CO2 emissions. It is possible to 
argue that CO2 emissions is a proxy for, or a case of environmental degradation in general. In 
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a situation where a relationship between deliberation and CO2 emissions can be supported, 
would this relationship also be found between deliberation and other indicators for 
environmental performance such as air quality, deforestation and management of fisheries? Of 
course, this is not something that can be assumed. However, if one study the previous research 
presented above on deliberation and its impact on the environment the main point is that the 
will of the people is to conserve the environment as they will gain from it. If the policy makers 
meet with civil society and corporations the output will be better environmental performance 
(Smith, 2003, p. 76, Lidskog and Elander, 2007, pp. 81-89, Li and Reuveny, 2006). Therefore, 
if the result of this study find support for the hypothesis one could imagine that the results also 
should be applicable to other indicators of environmental performance. It would thus be 
interesting to see further research on the matter. 
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Method 
 The study will be a quantitative statistical study. By using data regarding deliberation 
and emissions of CO2 statistical analysis can be conducted and answer the question whether 
deliberation might relate to the emissions of CO2. 
 
Statistical design 
As the processed material is immense a quantitative statistical design using is a 
logical choice. Other methods would require a lot more work to review the material. As 
mentioned above several scholars have theorised about deliberation and its impact on 
environmental indicators. However, previous studies have focused on qualitative design which 
makes it hard to generalise the results to other cases. Quantitative studies can to a higher degree 
see patterns that can be generalised to a bigger population. Important to say is that the result of 
this study probably would be interesting to follow up with qualitative research to examine the 
causal effects further.  
The statistical method of choice is Ordinary least square regression (OLS). This 
means that we can calculate the slope of a regression line which minimises the errors to all the 
points of measurement. This will yield a coefficient for the chosen variables (Berry and 
Feldman, 1985). The result will be interpreted and analysed based on regression outputs in the 
result section. By reviewing coefficients of the different variables, we can see if there is a 
positive or negative relationship and whether it is statistically significant or not. Conclusions 
will also be made from the value of the adjusted R square. R square shows how much of the 
variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the model. At the same time as it 
is tempting to use as many control variables as possible to get as high R square as possible it 
can be misleading. When we have so much data available there will always be some variable 
with a high correlation. High correlation does however not guarantee a causal relation which 
creates a need for adjustments when more variables are being added. Adjusted R squared 
accounts for the number of variables being used giving us a more cautious prediction (Berry 
and Feldman, 1985). Therefore, adjusted R square is presented in the tables. 
Another important value is the p- value. The p- value helps us answers whether a 
relationship could be coincidental (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p. 394). The p- value for a variable 
to be statistically significant in this study is 0.05. If a coefficient has a p-value higher than 0.05 
it means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is saying that an 
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independent variable is not related to the dependent variable, in this case CO2 emissions per 
capita. The fact that there is a hard line for what is considered as statistically significant does 
however not mean that values close to this limit are not relevant to mention. 
Standard error is a measurement of how far from the true value the measured 
value can be. This generates an interval which the value of a variable can be within. When using 
OLS we assume that the variance of the error is constant. If we cannot assume that we are 
dealing with constant variance of the error, we have a problem with heteroskedasticity. To 
account for this potential skewness one can use robust standard error instead of standard error 
creating a more cautious prediction (RobertL.Kaufman, 2013).  There are reasons to suspect 
heteroskedasticity when there is potential of a systematic differences in the error variance in 
the model (Berry and Feldman, 1985). As an example, we can look at the previously mentioned 
EKC. Countries with small GDP per capita will not have funds to invest in environmental 
efforts as they need to use their money on more urgent matters. It is reasonable to imagine that 
the variance of the error in the group of the poorest countries in the world is quite small as they 
do not really have a choice what to spend their money on. If we then look at rich countries, they 
have more funds to invest in environmental efforts and furthermore it is likely that the error 
will be larger in this group as they have opportunity to use their funds differently. Thus, there 
is reasons to suspect systematic variance of the error. 
Important to note is that it is not possible to draw conclusions about the causal 
mechanism, which is one of the bigger drawbacks of quantitative statistical designs. Even if it 
is possible to conclude high correlation between two variables, we cannot say for certain which 
one effects the other. This must be done true a theoretical framework to see what scenario is 
the most likely (Esaiasson et al., 2017). In this case we can imagine finding a correlation 
between countries with deliberative aspects in the society and lower CO2 emissions compared 
to countries with lower grades of deliberation supporting the hypothesis. This does not mean 
that we can conclude that more deliberation will lead to lower emissions of CO2. It only means 
that those variables are connected. It is just as likely from a statistical point of view that lower 
CO2 emissions tend to lead to more deliberation. Concluding the causal mechanisms behind 
relationships between different variables is an area more suitable for qualitative studies where 
deeper analysis of fewer cases can be conducted (Esaiasson et al., 2017). 
One can argue that the aim of the study also could be reached using a qualitative 
approach, for example a most similar design study could be an option. The goal with that kind 
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of study could also be to isolate the effect of the independent variable. In that case one would 
choose a few countries with as similar contexts as possible but with different values on the 
independent variable. Thus, they would have different degrees of deliberation. By this type of 
study, it would be possible to see if countries with more deliberation would have lower 
emissions of CO2 or not. The advantage of this type of study would be that one can examine 
how deliberation is practised in the different countries which is not possible in the same way in 
a statistical design1. The disadvantage with a qualitative design is however that it is harder to 
generalise the results beyond the chosen sample (Esaiasson et al., 2017). 
 
Variables 
 
The independent variable, deliberation is operationalised by the Deliberative 
component index from the V-Dem dataset. Possible values are ranging from 0 to 1, higher 
values meaning more deliberative components (Coppedge et al., 2018a). The advantage of 
using V-Dem is their method of merging different factors that affect democracy. The indicators 
are a blend of factual information (laws) and judgements of the governance of the state by 
country experts. The question that has been answered for making this variable is: “To what 
extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?”. The variable is an aggregation of 
several variables from V- Dem including reasoned justification, common good justification, 
respect for counterarguments, range of consultation and engaged society (Coppedge et al., 
2018b). By using this aggregated variable, it is possible to capture how policymakers try to 
justify their policy, respect other points of view and arguments and whether they consult the 
civil society when designing new policy (Coppedge et al., 2018b). 
The dependent variable is operationalised by the variable CO2 emissions per 
capita from the QoG dataset. In this case CO2
 emissions are defined as emissions of CO2
 from 
burning of fossil fuels and production of cement. The emissions are measured in metric tons 
(Teorell et al., 2018). QoG construct their dataset of information from several sources. The 
information on CO2 emissions is collected from the World Bank (2016). The variable for CO2 
emissions per capita is log- transformed. This is done to account for non- linear relationships 
between the variables (Benoit, 2011). One assumption that is made when using OLS is that we 
are dealing with linear relationships which means that we have to account for non- linear ones 
                                                     
1 A more extensive discussion about the variables will follow under Potential problems with the variables below 
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(Berry and Feldman, 1985). A non- linear relationship is potentially the case of deliberation and 
CO2 emissions per capita. One can for example imagine that an increase of deliberation from 
low levels of deliberation would have a stronger association with CO2 emissions per capita than 
increases from higher levels of deliberation would. 
To test H2 I will present a regression analysis where I only include the highest 
scoring countries in Electoral Democracy Index. This is equal to 25% of the sample. If it is not 
possible to see any relationship in some of the most democratic countries in the world, we 
cannot reject the second null hypothesis, that democracy does not influence the prospect for 
deliberation to associate with lower CO2 emissions per capita. 
Control variables 
 
To minimise the risk of drawing conclusions out of spurious relationship it is vital 
to examine the effect of control variables. With statistical design it is always the risk of missing 
out on the true explaining factors and via control variables we can isolate the effect of our 
independent variable. It is always the possibility that high correlation is caused by different 
underlying factors. At the same time as it is essential to control for enough variables so that we 
can isolate the effect of deliberation it is important to be parsimonious. It is only desirable to 
control for variables that are relevant in this case to avoid overspecification of the model. It is 
only relevant to control for variables that via previous research can be assumed to have an 
impact on the dependent and independent variable. It is therefore required to find research that 
supports the idea that possible control variables are related to the dependent and independent 
variable (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p. 99). The chosen control variables in this study are: electoral 
democracy, GDP per capita, corruption, oil production, latitude of countries capital, whether a 
country have signed the Kyoto protocol or not and CO2 emissions from 1990, which are all 
assumed to affect the dependent variable CO2 emissions. 
 The literature on how economic development is associated with different 
indicators of environmental performance is extensive. Scholars have argued that economic 
development makes production societies shift to service societies which are associated with 
lower CO2 emissions. Further on a high economic development is claimed to be connected with 
green and clean technology (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). These results have however been 
criticised and several scholars have shown that economic development instead is associated 
with higher emissions of CO2 per capita (Galeotti et al., 2006, Lægreid, 2017). As research on 
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the potential relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita is ambiguous 
GDP per capita becomes a relevant control variable. The data regarding GDP is based on the 
predicted value of GDP per capita in 2005. GDP per capita is measured in constant dollars and 
is collected from Gleditsch (2002) by  Teorell et al. (2018). The data on GDP per capita is log- 
transformed to account for a non- linear relationship (Benoit, 2011) which is the case with GDP 
per capita and CO2 emissions. As described the EKC indicates that economic development 
relates to CO2 emissions differently depending on the present GDP per capita. A poor country 
will increase their emissions as its economy grows but a rich country can potentially lower their 
emissions as its economy grows (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). 
 As the variable for deliberation include both democratic and authoritarian states 
it becomes relevant to control for the effect of deliberation in democracies. As mentioned above 
Li and Reuveny (2006) argue that democracy works as a force for better environmental 
performance. They mean that the public´s will is only truly considered in a liberal democratic 
context. It is logical to say that the people will gain from better environmental performance and 
democracies will therefore perform better (Li and Reuveny, 2006). Therefore, it becomes 
interesting to examine whether it is democracy rather than deliberation itself that relates to the 
emissions of CO2. One can argue that the relationship between deliberation and CO2 emissions 
only becomes apparent after a country has reached a certain threshold in their democratic 
development. In an authoritarian context one can imagine that the ones in control allow certain 
deliberative elements where members from the civil society are consulted without the intention 
of truly listening to them. Without the democratic mechanisms for accountability the hypothesis 
saying that deliberation is associated with lower CO2 may not work.  This would then possibly 
create a scenario where a country can receive a high score for deliberation but at the same time 
generate high emissions of CO2. Therefore, the variable for Electoral democracy index from V-
Dem is used to operationalise deliberation in democratic countries to isolate the effect of 
deliberation. The variable is based on the question: “To what extent is the ideal of electoral 
democracy in its fullest sense achieved?”(Coppedge et al., 2018b).  
 Another factor relevant for control is corruption. Several scholars find that the 
level of corruption is a key component for explaining a countries levels of CO2 emissions. Cole 
(2007, p. 644) finds that corruption has a positive relation with CO2 emissions. However, he 
also finds that in low income- contexts corruption tends to have a positive in direct association 
with CO2 as corruption tends to relate to lower income which relates to lower production and 
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therefore lower emissions. Welsch (2004, pp. 681-684) also finds that corruption can be 
associated with increasing and decreasing emissions of CO2. However, he suggests that the 
overall relation between corruption and CO2 emissions is positive. This make levels of 
corruption a relevant variable for control. A modern liberal democracy can score high points 
for deliberation and have low emissions but at the same time have low levels of corruption. In 
this scenario one can argue that it is in fact the corruption, or the lack of it, that is the driving 
force behind the decreasing emissions. At the opposite end of the spectrum one can imagine 
that a country scores high on deliberation, generates high emissions of CO2 at the same time as 
the corruption is widespread. In this situation one can argue that corruption makes state officials 
only consulting certain actors from the civil society or corporations, those who pay the most. 
Corruption will therefore be used for control. Corruption is operationalised by the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) which defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” 
and the data is taken from Transparency International (2017) via the dataset from QoG. (Teorell 
et al., 2018). Important to note is that a higher score of CPI means less corruption. 
 I also include population density as a control variable. Population density can be 
seen both as a positive and a negative factor for environmental performance. On the one hand 
an increasing degree of population density (generally) lead to stress on the environment via 
higher demand on water, space and transportation. At the same time, when people live close to 
each other the use of resources may also be more efficient. It is easier to provide water, food 
and effective transportation when people live in urbanised areas. Furthermore the use of land 
becomes more effective per capita in cities compared to rural areas (Arvin and Lew, 2011, p. 
1154). Both scenarios are likely which makes population density an interesting control variable. 
As the relationship between population density and CO2 emissions is potentially non- linear as 
described above population density is log- transformed in line with (Benoit, 2011). 
 Emissions of CO2 is closely connected whit the consumption and production of 
oil. Therefore, it is interesting to control for the effect of countries oil production. As earlier 
said one can imagine a scenario where policy makers to a high degree selectively consult civil 
society and corporations. Controlling for oil production would then capture the possible effect 
of political pressure applied from the oil industry. One can also argue that this variable would 
work as a proxy for countries dependency on oil and probably other fossil fuels (Povitkina, 
2018, p. 419). Oil production is measured in metric tons and is obtained from Ross and Mahdavi 
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(2015)  via QoG (Teorell and Svensson., 2018). The variable is divided with one million for 
easier interpretation. 
I also include the latitude of each country's capital from La Porta et al. (1999) via 
QoG (Teorell and Svensson., 2018) This is done to account for geographical heterogeneity in 
the sample; differences between the countries that cannot be observed via the datasets. For 
example, one can imagine that the climate of the country is related to their emissions of CO2. 
Countries with beneficial climate for farming would have had an advantage in expanding their 
economy and production and therefore potentially emitting more CO2 (La Porta et al., 1999, 
pp. 239, 244).  
 Another variable relevant for control is whether a country has signed the Kyoto 
protocol. It is likely that countries committed to the Kyoto protocol should emit less CO2 
compared to those who are not. Furthermore, one can argue that international agreements such 
as the Kyoto protocol are a kind of deliberation. One can therefore imagine that countries with 
a higher score for deliberation are more likely to have signed the Kyoto protocol. 
 The last control variable is the levels of CO2 emissions from 1990. The data on 
these emissions is also measured in metric tons and obtained from World Bank (2016) via 
Teorell et al. (2018). The levels of emissions from 1990 will of course relate to how extensive 
the emissions are 2014, when the latest data is available. Including these older emissions as a 
control variable captures the different variations in management of emissions that occur within 
the different countries since 1990. The emissions from 1990 also helps to explain the changes 
of emissions before 1990. These numbers on CO2 emissions are also log- transformed for the 
same reasons as the emissions from 2014. 
Test of robustness 
 
There are other ways of measuring democracy. The dataset from QoG contain a 
variable from Freedom House for classifying a country as free, partly free and not free (2018). 
One can argue that free and partly free countries should be considered as democracies (Teorell 
et al., 2018). Even though one must be humble to the fact that there are several ways of 
measuring democracy I argue that it is more relevant to use an index to measure democracy as 
Electoral democracy index to outline patterns. However, to see whether the different types of 
measurements results in different outputs an additional model will be available in the appendix 
where the variable for freedom from Freedom House will be used instead of electoral 
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democracy from V-Dem. The variable is recoded as dummy variable, democracy or no 
democracy. This regressions analysis will also include deliberative democracy index from V-
Dem instead of deliberative component index (Coppedge et al., 2018b). The variables for 
deliberation and democracy can be problematic which makes it interesting to see if other 
operationalisations give a different output. This will work as a test of robustness of the model. 
Data on CO2 emissions from QoG is available up to 2014. To test if the results in 
the first analysis is robust, I use changes in emissions over the years as dependent variable in a 
separate model which is available in the appendix. To see the changes, I use the levels of 
emissions from 2014 and subtract them from the levels of emissions from 1994 (twenty years 
before the most recent figures). This data is then merged with data on deliberation. If the results 
from the different analysis differ there is reason to question the robustness of the model. 
Potential problems with the variables 
 
 It is important to be aware of the limitations of the variables. The chosen variables 
must represent what is claimed to be examined. In this case CO2 emissions are represented by 
the World Banks definition of those emissions and deliberation is represented by V-Dems 
Deliberative Component Index. There are of course problems with both operationalisations. To 
measure emissions of CO2 is less controversial than measuring indicators of democracy. 
However, it is important to point out that for this study emissions are defined as emissions from 
burning of fossil fuels and production of cement within a country. This means that this study 
does not take note for outsourcing where production is mowed from richer countries to poorer 
ones. Thus, a population in a country can by consumption be a driving factor of emissions in 
other countries.  
 One can argue that this way of measuring does not reflect reality. While this is 
important to think of it is also a valid point that a state to the full extent, or at least for the most 
part, only can control the laws within the country. Country x can create strict environmental 
laws shifting an industrial society to a service society. On the contrary country x cannot write 
environmental laws in country y. It therefore makes sense to measure the emissions within a 
country (Brülde, 2015, .pp 84-85).  What is measured here is therefore the emissions of the state 
and not the carbon footprint of its inhabitants. That would however be an interesting approach 
for future research. 
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 Also, to be noted regarding the dependent variable is that the measurements are 
from 2014. Environmental politics is a dynamic area and one cannot ignore the possibility that 
important changes has occurred since the measurements were made. One example is the Paris 
agreement which entered into force October fifth, 2016.2 One can imagine that the prospects of 
deliberation, or any of the control variables, for being associated to the emissions of CO2 has 
changed since then. One can also imagine a scenario where the increasing number of warnings 
of climate change and the increasing pile of evidence that climate change is anthropocentric 
that has been presented since 20143 may influence the public’s interest in advocating and 
tolerating stricter environmental regulations. 
 The independent variable of this study is potentially more problematic. Data on 
this variable is taken from the eight version of V-Dems dataset on indicators of democracy 
(Coppedge et al., 2018b). It is important to stress that one can never be certain that the match 
between what we call deliberation and the data is one hundred percent. Why does one country 
get 0.3 and another country 0.4 on a scale of deliberation? Another problem is that one can 
imagine that the authorities arrange deliberative forums, but they do not really consider what 
the civil society says. The same potential problem can be found in one of the control variables; 
electoral democracy also from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2018b). Defining and measure 
democracy is hard, and the results needs to be interpreted carefully. As with deliberation one 
can wonder what make some countries score 1.3 and others 1.4. There is also the possibility 
that data from some countries are better than others. Furthermore, it can be problematic to 
compare different countries form of governing as every country's situation is somewhat unique. 
Both variables are collected from V-Dem and the problems with measuring democratic 
indicators are highly prioritised by the institute, and their method combining expert’s judgments 
with constitutional records4  is to be considered one of the more precise tools to measure 
democratic indicators today.  
 Measuring corruption could also be problematic as it in some way will rely on 
judgments. CPI is constructed by both surveys and expert judgements and is produced by 
Transparency International (2015). Different people have different perception of corruption. 
One can argue that people living in a low corrupt context has a lower acceptance rate for 
                                                     
2 https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification. Accessed 2018-11-26 
3 https://unfccc.int/news/scientists-warn-against-economic-disruption-from-climate-change. Accessed 2018-11-
26 
4This information is collected from https://www.v-dem.net/en/about/ 2018-11-21. More information about V-
Dem and their different datasets can be found on their website https://www.v-dem.net/en/ 
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corruption as they are used to little or no corruption at all. At the same time, one can imagine 
that people that have lived their whole lives in countries with high corruption has a higher 
acceptance rate for the same reason, high levels of corruption is all they know and therefore has 
another perception of it. I would however argue that CPI is a relevant measure to see trends of 
corruption. Benjamin Olken also points out that corrupt government officials in general are 
good at hiding corruption because it is illegal. This possibly creates a situation where people’s 
perception of how corrupt a country really is does not necessarily reflect the reality because 
they cannot see the corruption. Olkens findings suggests that several variables effect a person’s 
perception of corruption. Amongst them is education and age which not only effect the 
perception of corruption but also the likeliness of reporting it. Even if his findings suggests that 
there are multiple variables that do effect people’s perception of corruption he concludes that 
the effect is rather limited (Olken, 2009). 
Measuring social phenomena and interpreting social science must always be done 
with a critical mindset. We can never be completely sure that our methods and data are the best 
possible. One must always be humble for the possibility that relevant control variables are being 
overlooked or that all the chosen control variables are relevant. Furthermore, there are always 
limitations in terms of available data, time and other factors. However, with the limitations of 
quantitative statistical design it should be considered possible to see reliable results by the used 
methodology and material.  
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Results 
The result section is divided into two parts: results of the analysis and then a 
discussion of the robustness and possibilities to generalise the results. First, I will present and 
discuss Table 1 which is a bivariate analysis of the dependent and independent variable. Second, 
I discuss Table 2 which shows the results from the multivariate analysis with the control 
variables except CO2 emissions per capita from 1990. Thirdly I present and discuss Table 3 
which is the result of the analysis of the most democratic countries in the world according to 
Electoral Democracy index. Forth, I present Table 4 which contains a regression analysis of 
CO2 emissions per capita and all control variables including emissions of CO2 from 1990. In 
table 4 we can see how the significance of the effect of the different variables changes together 
with each other. 
H1 is not supported by the model in Table 1. Instead the results indicate that 
deliberation is related to higher per capita emissions of CO2. The coefficient is in addition 
statistically significant. 
Table 1. Bivariate regression analysis with CO2 emissions per capita from 2014 as the 
dependent variable. 
  
 CO2 emissions 
per capita (2014) 
Deliberation 1.504** 
 (0.5118) 
  
Intercept -0.381 
 (0.386) 
N 171 
adj. R2 0.051 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The analysis of Table 2 indicates as Table 1 a positive relationship between 
deliberation and CO2 emissions per capita saying that deliberation is associated to more per 
capita emissions of CO2. This relationship is however not statistically significant. We can 
therefore not reject the null hypothesis that deliberation does not relate to CO2 emission. Instead 
it is economic development, whether a country has signed the Kyoto protocol and the latitude 
of the capitals that are statistically significant. Economic development is statistically significant 
with a positive coefficient saying that higher economic development is associated with higher 
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emissions. This is in line with Lægreid (2017) and Galeotti et al. (2006) that argued that there 
is a lack of empirical evidence for theories like EKC claming that economic development will 
yield better environmental performance. 
 The coefficient for signing of the Kyoto protocol is negative which is in line with 
the made assumption that those countries are more committed to preventing climate change 
than others. Latitude of the capitals have a statistically significant effect. Thus, there are 
geographical factors that could be related to the emissions of CO2. 
Table 2 implies that democracies emit more than others. This relationship is 
however not statistically significant. The coefficient for CPI is negative indicating that less 
corruption is associated with less CO2 emissions per capita which is expected given previous 
research. Remember that a higher score of CPI means less corruption. CPI is however not 
statistically significant. One can still imagine that corruption is associated with emissions of 
CO2. One can of course argue that different operationalisations of corruption could yield 
different outputs. In this study corruption was operationalised with CPI which as discussed in 
the methods section could be have a downside. As CPI is very broad in its application one can 
imagine that it misses special nuances of corruption that only relates to CO2. For example, there 
is the possibility that a country in general does not have problems with corruption though its 
environmental authorities and politicians dealing with environmental policy are corrupt. 
Oil production does not seem to have any relationship with per capita emission of 
CO2 according to Table 2 as the coefficient is not statistically significant. Oil dependent 
countries can therefore not be assumed to be associated with higher emissions of CO2. 
Population density does not have any statistically significant association with per capita 
emission of CO2 according to Table 2. The population density coefficient is interesting as it 
could be interpreted as it highlights the two ways of how population density can relate to 
different emissions of CO2 emissions, which was described in the literature by Arvin and Lew 
(2011). One could therefore argue that population density has reached a point where the cons 
are being outplayed by effectiveness in terms of water- and food supply and transportation that 
comes with increasing density of population, even if this relationship as noted is not statistically 
significant. 
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Table 2. Regression analysis with CO2 emissions from 2014 as dependent variable.  
  
 CO2 emissions per capita 
(2014) 
Deliberation 0.437 
 (0.4781) 
  
Democracy 0.00809 
 (0.5124) 
  
GDP/capita 1.070*** 
 (0.1103) 
  
Corruption -0.00567 
 (0.0063) 
  
Oil production 0.0022 
 (0.0011) 
  
Population density -0.0283 
 (0.0531) 
  
Latitude of capital 1.197* 
 (0.5121) 
  
Kyoto protocol -0.717** 
 (0.2173) 
  
Intercept -8.863*** 
 (0.7295) 
N 131 
adj. R2 0.798 
Robust standard errors in in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis where only the highest scoring 
countries in Electoral Democracy Index are included. This is equal to 25% of the sample. The 
results indicate that there is no association between deliberation and CO2 emissions in the most 
democratic countries in the world either. Therefore, the results do not support H2. Thus, we 
should not reject the second null hypothesis saying that deliberation does not have a stronger 
association with lower emissions of CO2 per capita in more democratic contexts. The model in 
Table 3 also shows that signing the Kyoto protocol and the latitude of capitals does not relates 
to CO2 emissions per capita in more democratic countries. The effect of GDP per capita is also 
less statistically significant compared to Table 2. Instead it seems that oil production is related 
to emissions of CO2 per capita in more democratic countries as its coefficient is statistically 
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significant. Table 3 illustrates that the effect of different variables can change after certain 
thresholds. 
Table 3. Multivariate regression with CO2 emissions from 2014 as dependent variable. Only 
the highest scoring countries in Electoral Democracy Index are included*. 
  
 CO2 emissions per capita 
(2014) 
Deliberation -0.152 
 (1.0087) 
  
Democracy -5.131 
 (1.7631) 
  
GDP/capita 0.485* 
 (0.2853) 
  
Corruption 0.00672 
 (0.0047) 
  
Oil production 0.00303** 
 (0.0009) 
  
Population density -0.0456 
 (0.0493) 
  
Latitude of capital -0.155 
 (0.8426) 
  
Kyoto protocol 0.454 
 (0.3189) 
  
Intercept 0.812 
 (2.6524) 
N 33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
* This is equals 25% of the sample 
 
By examining Table 4 we can see that H1 is not supported when emissions from 
1990 are included either. The initial analysis of electoral democracy indicates a positive 
relationship which is statistically significant, saying that consolidated democracies emit more 
CO2 than other countries. This relationship is though not statistically significant when 
controlled for. Economic development has a statistically significant effect both with and 
without the other control variables. The coefficient is however considerably smaller when 
controlled for. Without the other control variables, the coefficient for signing the Kyoto 
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protocol is positive and statistically significant implying that signing the Kyoto protocol is 
related to higher emissions of CO2 per capita, and thus the opposite of what was expected. 
However, when controlled for, the coefficient becomes negative and remaining statistically 
significant as in Table 2. Corruption has a positive statistically significant effect when it is 
analysed without the other control variables. As a higher score of CPI means less corruption 
these results imply that less corruption relates to more CO2 emissions per capita. When 
controlled for the effect of corruption is, as in Table 2, however not statistically significant. The 
coefficient for the levels of emissions per capita from 1990 is statistically significant and 
positive both with and without the other control variables. The coefficient is saying that an 
increase of CO2 emissions 1990 per capita is related to an increase of CO2 emissions 2014 as 
the relationship is positive. This would suggest that those countries with higher emissions of 
CO2 1990 per capita still are the ones who emit the most today. However, the coefficient is 
smaller 2014 compared to 1990 implying that the increase of emissions has slowed down. 
When using all control variables, the model explains circa 90 percent of the 
variation in the dependent variable (CO2 emissions per capita) which can be seen by looking at 
the value of the adjusted R square. Important to note is that the emissions from 1990 constitute 
a substantial part of the value of the adjusted square. The CO2 emissions from 1990 alone has 
an adjusted square value of circa 86 percent. 
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Table 4. CO2 emissions per capita from 2014 as the dependent variable. 
Robust standard errors statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
The result from the regression analysis using different operationalisations of 
deliberation and democracy, which can be seen in the appendix, does not differ much from the 
one seen in Table 2. Neither deliberation or democracy relates to CO2 emission per capita with 
these operationalisations either. These results indicate that the model in Table 2 is robust. 
However, passing a robustness test does not mean that we can conclude that the model is robust, 
it is only an indication.  The regression analysis using changes in CO2 emissions between 2014 
and 1994 as dependent variable, which can be seen in the appendix however indicates that only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
CO2/capita 
(2014) 
Deliberat
ion 
1.504**         0.148 
 (0. 5126)         (0.3194) 
           
Democra
cy 
 1.982***        -0.0570 
  (0.5126)        (0.3212) 
           
Eco. dev.   1.023***       0.436** 
   (0.0545)       (0.1374) 
           
Corrupti
on 
   0.0449***      -0.0024 
    (0.0043)      (0.0042) 
           
Oil prod.     0.0066***     0.0007 
     (0.0011)     (0.0007) 
           
Pop. den.      0.0448    0.0015 
      (0.0858)    (0.0333) 
           
Lat. cap.       4.466***   0.270 
       (0.5041)   (0.3908) 
           
Kyoto 
prot. 
       1.668***  -0.654*** 
        (0.1519)  (0.1481) 
           
CO2/capi
ta (1990) 
        0.803*** 0.618*** 
         (0.036) (0.0805) 
           
Intercept -0.381 -0.530 -8.226*** -1.296*** 0.489*** 0.465 -0.564** 0.233 0.418*** -3.254*** 
 (0.386) (0.3548) (0.4811) (0.2433) (0.1212) (0.0856) (0.2039) (0.1356) (0.0504) (0.9524) 
N 171 167 189 180 172 190 150 171 158 130 
adj. R2 0.051 0.094 0.752 0.322 0.085 -0.004 0.272 0.196 0.857 0.912 
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corruption has a statistically significant effect which was not the case in Table 2. This could 
potentially indicate a problem with the model in Table 2. One would expect that if a variable is 
related to the levels it should be related to the changes even if we of course cannot assume this. 
The overall results from the regression analysis above does not support H1 or H2 
and we cannot reject the null hypotheses. By looking at the regressions analysis we cannot see 
any statistical assured connection between variations of CO2 emissions and deliberation. One 
can argue that this in some way is in line with previous research in that matter that different 
scholars have reached different conclusions. These non-results are also important. However, 
we must consider if these results reflect the reality or if it can be something wrong with the 
model. I would argue that deliberative component index is an appropriate choice of variable to 
represent deliberation. This because it measures different components and creates a scale 
instead of binary variables. It captures various types of governance. One can of course argue 
that the cases that are interesting to examine are the one where the interests of the public and 
civil society are truly considered and discussed in deliberative forums. One can therefore 
imagine that deliberation would have an effect in those countries which are above the average 
score in deliberative component index. This could be an interesting starting point for future 
research. One could also imagine that other operationalisation of CO2 emissions could yield a 
different output. As this study defined emissions as those caused by production within a 
country, emissions generated from imported goods are not included. As a countries 
consumption of imported goods can cause more emissions than those that are not, one can argue 
that a broader definition of emissions would be more realistic. 
 While we cannot say that deliberation in general is related to lower emissions it 
is still possible that this is the case in some contexts that I have not examined in this study. The 
model in Table 2 and Table 4 do explain a lot of the variation in emissions. However, there is 
still more variation that is unexplained which means that there are several other factors that are 
important. 
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Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to examine a potential relationship between deliberation 
and countries efforts to decrease their contributions to climate change. This was done by 
studying whether deliberation is associated with lower levels of CO2 emissions. By using a 
statistical design, no relationship in either positive or negative direction was discovered. Instead 
the results indicate that it is economic development, whether the country has signed the Kyoto 
protocol or not, a country´s geographical location and earlier levels of emissions that relates to 
the CO2
 emissions. 
Previous research about democratic mechanisms such as deliberation´s potential 
association with improved environmental performance such as lower emissions of CO2 is as 
noted ambiguous (Smith, 2003, Lidskog and Elander, 2007, Eckersley, 2004, Scruggs, 2009). 
As the result in this study does not imply any relationship between deliberation and lower CO2 
emissions one can argue that advocates for deliberation should admit that the empirical facts 
are not in their favour. The empirics presented above are tilting towards the null hypothesis 
saying that deliberation does not relate to lower emissions of CO2 in either more or less 
democratic countries. Would the result therefore support an idea that authoritarian rule is better 
than others in preventing climate change? I would be hesitant to this conclusion. One can of 
course argue that a green authoritarian state that puts the environment first would be the most 
environmentally friendly state. As we cannot assume that the public would use deliberation to 
advocate environmentalism we cannot assume that authoritarian rulers would either. At the 
same time, one can argue that there is still hope for deliberation as the results does not indicate 
a negative relationship either. I would therefore say that these results are in line with previous 
ambiguous research. There is still room for refinement of theories claiming that deliberation 
will yield lower CO2 emissions. As there is unexplained variation left there are certainly a lot 
of important factors to examine. 
There is also the possibility of interaction between variables. Even though that 
none of them indicated to be related to CO2 emissions here there is still the possibility of 
interaction effects between deliberation and democracy. They may not be significant by 
themselves, but possibly when interacting. One can think that deliberation in some contexts still 
is associated with lower emissions and that this effect will be more distinguished in 
democracies. It is also possible that democracy and deliberation could play a more central role 
in tackling environmental degradation in the future. As the effects of climate change becomes 
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more apparent one can imagine that the demand for environmental regulations will increase, 
potentially via deliberation. Furthermore, one can imagine that increasing awareness of 
environmental degradation and climate change also should be followed by public interest in 
ambitious environmental policy. I would therefore find it likely, as it is in the public’s interest, 
that democratic and deliberative institutions will relate to better environmental performance in 
the future. This would be interesting to see in coming research that should investigate whether 
there are contexts where deliberation could be a method for lowering emissions of CO2 and if 
the prospects for this change over time. This is interesting since a lot of the research reach 
different conclusions. 
It would furthermore be interesting to see if the non- relationship that was found 
in this study could be applicable to other indicators of environmental performance such as air 
quality, deforestation, eutrophication and biodiversity. One can argue that a potential 
relationship between deliberation and CO2 emissions also should be found between deliberation 
and other environmental indicators. This as previous research argued for a relationship between 
deliberation and environmental performance in general. However, the results in this study say 
otherwise. The gap between theory and the empirics therefore makes it problematic to apply 
the results regarding CO2 to other indicators of environmental performance. It is of course 
possible that there is a negative relationship between deliberation and for example deforestation 
or air quality but not for CO2 emissions. It is possible that the case of CO2 has particular 
elements that make it stand out from other environmental performance indicators. For example, 
emissions of CO2 are more closely linked to profitable production industry than for example 
deforestation. Applying the results in this study to other indicators of environmental 
performance would imply that the public and civil society would not use their influence to 
advocate for example cleaner air, less deforestation, less eutrophication, enhanced biodiversity 
and others. Of course, every individual case (country) has its own unique situation and context 
and the same goes with different environmental performance indicators. If a countries economy 
is highly dependent on logging industry one can imagine that deliberation would not lead to 
less deforestation, potentially more, while deliberation would lead to decreasing emissions of 
CO2 if the economy in this particular country is not dependent of emission intensive industry. 
Applying the results of this study to other cases of environmental performance indicators would 
therefore needed to be done carefully. 
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Appendix A - Analysis with alternative operationalisations  
 
Regressions analysis with the changes in CO2 emissions between 2014 and 1994 as the 
dependent variable.  
 (1) 
 CO2 emissions 
(20 years) 
Deliberation -0.205 
 (1.397357) 
  
Democracy -2.203 
 (2.624025) 
  
GDP/capita -0.516 
 (0.3235091) 
  
Corruption 0.056* 
 (0.0312677) 
  
Oil production -0.001 
 (0.0050551) 
  
Population 
density 
0.159 
 (0.1768346) 
  
Latitude of 
capitals 
0.162 
 (2.280537) 
  
Kyoto 
protocol 
1.615 
 (0.9451554) 
  
CO2 emission 
(1990) 
0.0163 
 (0.3538988) 
  
Intercept 2.166 
 (0. 2.196804) 
N 129 
adj. R2 0.069 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
  
 
Regression analysis with CO2 emissions from 2014 as the dependent variable. Deliberation is 
operationalised via Deliberative Democracy index. Democracy is operationalised via a dummy 
variable from Freedom House. 
 (1) 
 CO2 
emissions/capita 
(2014) 
Deliberation -0.194 
 (0.2449814) 
  
Democracy 0.185 
 (0.1318471) 
  
GDP/capita 0.445** 
 (0.137502) 
  
Corruption -0.00195 
 (0.0044656) 
  
Oil production 0.000738 
 (0.0007412) 
  
Population 
density 
-0.00661 
 (0.0321149) 
  
Latitude of 
capitals 
0.291 
 (0.3835935) 
  
Kyoto 
protocol 
-0.656*** 
 (0.1385191) 
  
CO2 
emissions/capi
ta (1990) 
0.613*** 
 (0.0811384) 
  
Intercept -3.311*** 
 (0.9678982) 
N 130 
adj. R2 0.914 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Appendix B – Descriptive statistics 
 
CO2 emissions per capita 2014 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
  co2_14_log |        191    .6426842    1.503397  -3.112595   3.816024 
 
Deliberative Component Index 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
 v2xdl_delib |        172    .6557801    .2459149   .0211708   .9861115 
 
 
Electoral Democracy Index 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
vdem_polya~y |        168     .551288    .2442211   .0264776    .924651 
 
 
GDP per capita 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
gle_rgdpclog |        192    8.726192    1.284245   5.655817   11.46894 
 
CPI 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
      ti_cpi |        181    42.82476     19.5057          8         92 
 
Oil production 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
  oil_miljon |      8,814    18.60661    62.13455          0        616 
 
 
 
  
Population density 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
wdi_popden~g |        192    4.327035    1.413843   .6323679   9.855662 
 
 
Latitude of capitals 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
 lp_lat_abst |     10,829    .2836215    .1889851          0   .7222222 
 
.  
Kyoto protocol 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
 kyoto_force |     14,770    .0298578    .1702007          0          1 
 
 
CO2 emission per capita 1990 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
  co2_90_log |        160    .1674531     1.76809  -3.729363   3.330748 
 
Deliberative Democracy Index 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
vdem_delib~m |        168    .4085341    .2630838   .0025476   .9121205 
 
Dummy variable for democracy 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
dum_demokr~i |        194    .7371134    .4413403          0          1 
 
 
 
  
Appendix C – Variables from V-Dem 
Deliberative component index 
Question: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved? 
Components:  
 
Engaged society 
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how 
independent are public deliberations?  
Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other 
public forums such as popular media.  
Responses: 
0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed. 
1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost 
always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 
2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are 
typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 
3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups 
participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same 
across issue-areas. 
4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups 
often participate and vary with different issue-areas. 
5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies 
among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots 
deliberation is common and unconstrained.  
 
  
Reasoned justification 
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been 
made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their 
positions? 
Responses: 
0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be 
done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending." 
 
1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for 
doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may 
appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The 
inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce 
spending 
and it might undermine essential services.] 
 
2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed 
policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because 
taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs." 
 
3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced 
and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot 
afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, 
and deficit spending would lead to inflation." 
Common good 
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political 
elites justify their positions in terms of the common good? 
Responses: 
0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered. 
 
  
1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part 
offered as justifications. 
 
2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it 
is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other. 
 
3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests 
and on appeals to the common good. 
 
4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common 
good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping 
144 the least advantaged in a society.  
 
Respect counterarguments 
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political 
elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments? 
Responses: 
0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished. 
 
1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored. 
 
2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a 
negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them. 
 
3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive 
statements about them. 
 
4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they 
ultimately reject them for the most part. 
 
5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and 
frequently also even accept them and change their position. 
  
Range of consultation 
Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of 
consultation at elite levels? 
Responses: 
0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative 
decisions on their own. 
 
1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites. 
 
2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such 
as the ruling party’s or parties’ local executives and/or women, youth and other branches. 
 
3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties. 
 
4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives. 
 
5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all 
politically relevant sectors of society and business. 
 
Electoral democracy index 
Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved? 
 
Components: 
 
Freedom of expression index 
Question: To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of 
ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the 
freedom of academic and cultural expression? 
 
 
 
 
  
Freedom of association thick index 
Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to 
participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to 
operate freely? 
 
Share of population with suffrage 
Question: What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national 
elections? 
Responses: Percent. 
 
Clean elections index 
 
Question: To what extent are elections free and fair? 
